

SHORTHAND RECORD

of the 20th session of the

SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL

HELD ON 15 APRIL 1994

Present: President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and President of the Supreme Defence Council Zoran LILIĆ, President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ and President of the Republic of Montenegro Momir BULATOVIĆ - members of the Supreme Defence Council, President of the Federal Government Radoje KONTIĆ, Federal Defence Minister Pavle BULATOVIĆ, Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff Colonel General Momčilo PERIŠIĆ and Chief of the Military Office of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Major General Slavko KRIVOŠIJA.

(Shorthand record of the meeting taken by Jordan ŽIVKOVIĆ, senior debate stenographer - editor in the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

President of the Supreme Defence Council Zoran LILIĆ chaired the session.

Zoran LILIĆ:

I propose we begin with the session of the Supreme Defence Council.

On the basis of the last session's conclusions we have proposed the following agenda for today:

CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION

Are there any suggestions for amendments to the proposed Agenda?

Radoje KONTIĆ:

I have a few issues to discuss under Other Business.

Zoran LILIĆ:

All right, we shall discuss this under Current Issues.

We are moving to the first Agenda Item:

CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION

I give the floor to General PERIŠIĆ

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

This is more than our soldier's view of the political solution of the crisis in this region. Later I would like to tell you about concrete measures undertaken and the danger for the SR /Federal Republic/ of Yugoslavia /FRY/.

On the territory of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia the interests of four great powers are dominant – the USA, the Russian Federation, the EU lead by Germany and Turkey leading extremist Islamic countries.

Each of the above countries has its own particular and general common objectives, which enable them to have a common approach to the solution of the Yugoslav crisis, and risk to the interests of any of them.

The USA want to establish a fire wall which would prevent the EU and Russian Federation countries from accessing oil fields and other natural resources. Germany wants to get through to the Near East to connect with raw material sources and get an outlet to a warm sea. The Russian Federation wants to have an outlet to a warm sea through Serbia and Montenegro. Turkey wants to cut a "green transversal" at least up to the Cazin Krajina, and later to Western Germany.

This would be the map representing conflicting interests on Yugoslav territory. The USA interests are this hatched section of the map (he is showing on the map), and these are probable further intentions. These are the interests of Germany and these of

the Russian Federation. The Turkish and USA interests coincide to some extent, only they are in *different directions*.

The other important thing in this phase of solving the Yugoslav crisis is that all the above countries are still in the course of /sorting out/ their general interests, and each further step takes them further apart and into conflict. In essence, it is a clash between two powers: the USA as the world power and Germany as the European one, while all the others are there to do the jobs in individual stages of the realisation of the USA and German interests.

This has not been copied from anywhere; this is our in-depth analysis and *summarised information and projections of the General Staff*.

The demarcation line between the USA and Germany will correspond to their respective forces, with the USA aiming to move it as far as possible to the north-west, and Germany to the south-east of the former Yugoslavia. Graphically, it looks like this (he is showing on the map).

The USA interests in the first stage - shown in blue on the map - are to take Albania. They have already achieved this. Further they want to take Macedonia and /extend their/ influence on Bulgaria. In the second stage they wanted to create a Muslim - Croatian coalition - and they have done it. In the third stage they want to push the Serbs into this coalition. The fourth stage is - when they finish with all this - to connect with the already implemented first stage through Kosovo.

The German interests in the first phase are to take a part of Croatia – they have already done it, and come out to the sea. In the second stage they want to gain influence over the territory of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, first in the Cazin Krajina. They also have some interests in the present coalition. In the third phase they want to solve the issue of Krajina, and in the fourth to go eastward.

Looking at the conflict of interests we can see here, irrespective of the power balance, that we on the territory of the former Yugoslavia are “playing” for their interests, while a lot of us think that we are the ones creating /the situation/ – I mean these who are fighting there. The conflicting interests would be: the first line of conflict would be somewhere here (he is showing on the map). The second line of demarcation would be here – that means Republika Srpska would be dominated by the USA interests. The third line might include this.

If the USA interests win it would in many ways coincide with our interests. This demarcation line would cover Serbian countries. If the German option wins this line would go somewhere there (he is showing on the map).

Possible scenario of further developments:

There would be no halting the process until the global objectives are realised or the big ones understand that they may come into conflict. It depends on whether they are prepared to keep solving this further. The NATO combat operations around Goražde is in fact the feeling of the pulse of the Serbian forces and the Russian people, but not the leadership. If the result of the operation are not clear enough they

will probably repeat it in the other part, very probably in the Bihać sector. They are already threatening and were threatening before. It nearly happened in the Tuzla sector yesterday; in the Doboj sector or Goražde again – all with the objective of cutting the corridor and bringing the Serbian people in Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina before a fait accompli – to accept a confederal or some similar negative solution.

Further, they will try to connect the “green transversal” without armed rebellion through Kosovo - they will try to do it without armed rebellion.

The following would be the creation of a third Yugoslavia which would include the eastern speech region, Croatia, BH, Serbia and Montenegro, without Macedonia, which is under direct USA influence, and Slovenia, which is under German influence, although this alternative is in many ways unacceptable.

This alternative does not suit the Serbian people because three very important things remain: the /issue of/ Šiptars /derogatory term for Albanians/ remains unsolved, and the influence of Turks and of course, Ustashas is still possible.

Fourth, our chances to control the crisis are based on the following: that we continue disrupting their scenario as we have done so far. we have almost completely realised our objectives with weapons. We must maintain this and with wise politics before the international community manage somehow to have it all endorsed.

Also there is the difference among the countries involved in the crisis and the possibility of confrontation between them if the interests of any of them are endangered. Also the struggle of the Serbian and Montenegrin people needs to get as much support in the world as possible – they already started having some international support. On the basis of this we should draw our moves in the future.

The measures which in our opinion ought to be undertaken: to develop broad diplomatic activity with all participants of the Yugoslav crisis, with the objective of crowning the war results and verifying them by international recognition.

Further, by selective approach to the countries and individuals who favour us, we should secure urgent import of weapons and military equipment, which in the event of the escalation of the conflict we would use for inflicting the greatest possible losses on the enemy, especially hitting air targets, because anti-aircraft defence is far weaker than it should be.

The bombing of positions in the Goražde sector ought to be used for strengthening the unity of all forces defending the national interest of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples.

Now I would like to stress the following:

The bombing of Serbian positions in the Goražde sector has in many ways had a negative impact in terms of FRY security. If they continue in this vein, and we have seen that it is possible, and if they launch a massive strike on the Republika Srpska

territory, they will certainly use the fighter aircraft to isolate the battlefield. We said they have about 250 airplanes in Italy and on aircraft carriers. This includes 137 bomber planes and about 90 interceptors. The most probable scenario, if they launched a massive strike on Bosnian territory, which will happen if combat operations and politics there are not conducted properly, is that they would use fighters to isolate the battlefield and protect themselves from the possibility of our aviation attacking them. This would greatly endanger the FRY airspace. If we acted according to the protection of airspace principle, there could be an incident, which they would use to draw us into war.

Further, if we are indifferent to their activities in the enclaves and out of them, they will endeavour to take the firestorm of war to the FRY by land. They have infiltrated from the Goražde enclave fresh forces from the Igman area and before the planned offensive operations, which they launched later facing Foča, Rogatica and Čajniče. If there was no such activity they would probably have come out at the border to Montenegro and put us in a position to either engage our forces or watch it from the distance, but sooner or later the war danger would become greater. Now they have only tried to see what our reaction would be, with the objective to go towards Albania across Sandžak, the Raška district and Kosovo in the later stage.

Such a situation may be repeated in other enclave sectors, but it is less probable because they have a very small number of soldiers.

They will most probably focus their operations on cutting the corridor on the Doboј – Bosanski Šamac and Brčko axes. A significant concentration of Croatian

forces has already been observed there, which they have brought from Lika, Gosić, Rijeka, Istra, even from Zagreb, from the north Sava river area. Organised preparations are already underway for the 2nd and 3rd Corps operations from the south facing the Sava river.

Most probably they wanted to have at any cost the Tuzla airport without any control, and upon cutting the corridor to immediately “pump in” these forces into the corridor, present us with a fait accompli, and engaging the UN forces maintain what they have achieved in the corridor. This would be the greatest danger for the position of Serbs in Republika Srpska and the Serbian Krajina.

In order to prevent surprise and not provoke them by anything, we have undertaken the following measures: we stepped up security at the borders to Albania, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina; we have engaged a larger number of men along the axes and sent units for in-depth security of the border.

Further, we put air force and anti-aircraft units into the state of combat alert. In case of escalation of danger we have planned that specific forces – PVO /anti-aircraft defence/ units - would come out to the eastern Republic of Serbian Krajina border with Croatia and Bosnia in order to protect the bridges and prevent /?possible/ violation of our territory.

We have not yet decided on the move to come out to that area for two reasons: first, because the mass PVO unit movement – and about four anti-aircraft light artillery battalions would need to be engaged – would not remain unnoticed by the

military and diplomatic representatives, neither would the AWACS /Airborne Warning and Control System/ recording.

The second reason for our not going there is because they want to exhaust us. For example, a PVO regiment in full operation, aimed at preventing surprise, uses about 400 tonnes of fuel daily – if they are active over ten hours. This means that we would have used all our Army reserves in a few days. If we used multi-barrel systems – see these systems (he is showing on the map) – if they were to defend bridges, they would do it successfully if bridges were to be attacked with classic devices – guided devices. Because in order to be certain to hit the bridge he has to approach it at a low height – into the anti-aircraft artillery zone of operations – they we would be able to defend them. But, if they decide to use modern devices, they can launch them from the distance of 15 – 20 km; then anti-aircraft units are not effective.

We suggest, and would appreciate it if a relevant decision were made here, that we do not move our /?Cubic systems/ which are deployed around Novi Sad, Belgrade, Kraljevo, Kragujevac and in the Niš and Priština sectors, towards the border because we would use a lot of resources and we would have to be in the field for a long time, which would exhaust both our units and enormous resources, while the effect in this waiting game would be reduced to punishing those who violate the airspace. Proportionately to the degree of danger and risk we would selectively introduce anti-aircraft units in bridges sectors. We would not deploy them in positions, but put them in the zones of expected operation where they would be hidden and able to come out within minutes and protect the bridges. I am saying this

for many reasons; first, training, reduced expenditure of materiel, and it would have a positive effect on the population in this region, and on the other side.

In the Podgorica, Ponikve, Novi Sad, and in all other sectors we have units in combat readiness capable of 100% protection of features if these regions were under threat.

A decision ought also to be made on the time of sending /the units/, which we have already approved, to help them with regard to the PVO – they requested that. If the situation were quieter, as it is today, we could begin with the implementation tomorrow already.

This is the military and political situation in brief.

If there are any questions I am ready to answer them.

Zoran LILIĆ:

Thank you, Moma

Are there any questions or need for further information?

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

These studies on what they identified as their spheres of interest are important for us because we can use their clash of interest. Otherwise, it is of no interest to us in any other way because we want to remain an autonomous and independent country. It is all the same to us if the Turkish – American, Turkish – German or German – American alternative prevails. The whole problem with us is that we did not want to enter this interest zone, but keep our independence.

Therefore we do not have to “look into a crystal ball” to see whether these or those masters would suit us better because no masters suit us. In that respect we have our own politics.

As for this situation I think that at the moment our first goal is to use appropriate negotiations to bring them to freeze operations on the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to have the front line recognised as the demarcation line, which in the situation when our forces control 72% of the territory, would create a very good position for finalising negotiations. In this respect we have been talking with international representatives in recent days. I believe that we are moving towards a solution and general cease of hostilities, and the establishment of the front demarcation line, including the right Drina bank near Goražde because it would not be in our interest to abandon the right bank of the Drina. Our advantage is that at some point, in order to trick us, they avoided defining the borders of the Goražde safe area. Now they are paying for it – there are no safe area borders. The Serbian side says: “the safe area is Goražde town on the left bank of the Drina, no borders were established before that”. Now they will establish the borders according to the status quo on the map. Otherwise the whole right bank of the Drina is taken, and the bridges

are taken. There are still a few points on the right bank that have not been taken, but I think it would not be a major problem.

Such a situation would in every respect reduce the possibility of any escalation of the war, so we would not be in danger or financially exhausted by a high state of alertness, while on the other hand we would open up a possibility to find a solution by some other political means, where in fact the main bone of contention would be our insisting that they must “swallow” the whole issue of sanctions with it. Because any agreement on our side to some flexible interpretation of the sanctions issue, easing off, suspension, etc. would only be abused. Therefore we will make a mistake if we “swallow this hook”. A political solution must be generally linked to the sanctions. We received Russian assurances that they would publicly and officially support such an approach in the coming days.

Therefore I think that General PERIŠIĆ’s suggestion not to pass any decisions on moving these Cubic systems is good. We now have agricultural works, and each regiment would spend 4 thousand tonnes of fuel in ten days. We should get into that expenditure, especially because I believe that everything is indicating that it should not be necessary. But, let’s assess that together.

I believe that we ought to accept PERIŠIĆ’s suggestions. This thing that he is stressing that the PVO might achieve some things through regular exercise is no problem, although in terms of the population, it has both a positive and a negative side: the positive side is that we are there, and the negative one is that they suspect that “there will be war”! I think that there are more negative than positive sides there.

It is positive only that if it begins they see that we are there, but if there are no indications yet and we are there, then the people see it as a disturbance. This needs to be assessed and these movements need to be adjusted to the current situation so that we don't create a great hullabaloo which might unnecessarily disturb the population.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

I agree with General PERIŠIĆ's concrete proposals and Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ's assessments.

As for the spheres of interest, while General PERIŠIĆ was talking I remembered that story when Nikšić was bombed in WW II both by the allies and the Germans. Then the people would ask each other: "Do you know whose plane this is?", and the other one would reply: "I don't know whose plane it is, but I know that the bombs are ours!" (Laughter). It seems that we are in a similar situation.

I personally don't think that further resolution of the crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia will incline towards a general conflict. Of course, the Army must take into account this element and prepare accordingly. I believe that the priority must be diplomatic activities, which above all, are most successfully conducted by President MILOŠEVIĆ. I think that we ought to continue in this direction. On the other hand, we need to show a certain amount of strength, which we have already done on the fronts in Republika Srpska, but also continue diplomatic negotiations. Of course it is easier to negotiate when your position on the front is good.

That's all.

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

I presented our line of reasoning in the worst possible case. I think we should prepare for it hoping that it won't happen. We would be very happy if it didn't. But, these are our calculations of what could befall us in the worst case of escalation of the conflict in this region, while we are doing everything to prevent it.

Zoran LLIĆ:

Does anyone else want to say anything?

I think we can agree that our priority should be diplomatic activities, which President MILOŠEVIĆ has been conducting, and where developments are going in the direction he illustrated, and there is every chance they will end up as predicted. We should give absolute priority to these activities and coordinate our overall activities in this direction, of course bearing in mind the information presented to us by General PERIŠIĆ on the measures to step up combat readiness undertaken by the Yugoslav Army.

I think that we can have a conclusion that the Yugoslav Army General Staff undertakes to continue with monitoring, assessing and timely proposals to the Supreme Defence Council possible measures for removal of danger, if the need arises. I think we can adopt such a conclusion and do not initiate the use of these

cumbersome systems for financial reasons, because in this situation there is no need for it.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

They will destroy themselves as time goes by. (Laughter).

Zoran LILIĆ:

Yes, the Americans are destroying their own helicopters, we shouldn't disturb them when they do it so well! (Laughter).

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

Our people on the Nikšić tableland gunned down a Muslim helicopter a few days ago. They had painted it white to look as a UN helicopter from the distance. That was that big Russian MI-8 helicopter. There were 28 men in it. They did not even announce that it was gunned down. First, they are forbidden to fly; second what business did they have there – therefore they did not say anything!

Zoran LILIĆ:

All right, let's move on to current issues.

Minister BULATOVIĆ and I owe you the information on possible forms of organisation of foreign trade in weapons and military equipment. We have mostly coordinated on this, as I had the delicate task of assisting in the whole business.

I give the floor to the Federal Defence Minister.

Pavle BULATOVIĆ:

Mr President, gentlemen, in line with your conclusion we have undertaken certain activities in the Federal Government to resolve the position of the SDPR /Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement/. There are several issues there: first is the legal issue of how to remove the SDPR, i.e. *Jugoimport's* /import-export enterprise/ entry into the Court Register as a holding company because the documentation at the Court's disposal was rather mixed and there is a chance that there might have been some falsified documents which someone gave to the Court on behalf of the Federal Government, so the Court registered the company on this basis. Proceedings are now before the Court to render the re-registration of SDPR into *Jugoimport* holding company legally invalid.

With regard to the above we at the Ministry thought about possible forms of organising an import – export organisation which would trade in weapons and military equipment, and basically offered the following two alternatives: one is that it is within the umbrella of the Federal Ministry of Defence like the Federal Material Reserves Directorate is a part of the Federal Ministry of Trade. It would be a for-

profit organisation, not covered by /federal/ budget, but its operation etc, would be controlled.

The other alternative is a more liberal one – that all import – export firms registered for foreign trade can do this, and this business would be conducted through control of import and export permits, consignments, etc.

President LILIĆ offered a complete organisational scheme including the structure of the managing board, Federal Government's authorisation for the appointment of the managing board, the company's director general, etc. My suggestion is, as the Federal Government has to make a decision on this, that the Federal Government working bodies formulate a proposal for an acceptable solution and that this firm be organised according to this country's needs. Because, the way it has been done so far, we have only had losses, including both the state and the Army.

I think that this business with the Court should be finalised very soon. Then at the same time the Government could prepare the ground for the establishment of this new company with a new face.

Zoran LILIĆ:

The essence of the proposal is that foreign trade in weapons and military equipment should be under absolute control of the Federal Government, i.e. the Ministry of Defence, and that the current practice with regard to equipment and technology ceases. This is included in the first option drafted by the Federal Ministry.

What I have given you represents a possible organisation of this system, which ought to be as the Federal Government decides.

I think that we can task the Government to implement this as soon as possible in line with the proposal of the Defence Minister.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

If we opted for all companies registered for foreign trade which operate only with some minor Government supervision, it would be wrong and there would be chaos. There needs to be one state enterprise which does this. This is not a new enterprise, this is an enterprise directly under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

The question here is, should it be within a framework, or as an individual enterprise.

Zoran LILIĆ:

In any case the government must have total control.

Pavle BULATOVIĆ:

The Government nominates members of the managing board and director general.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

The only question is whether it should be totally free or part of the Ministry.

Zoran LILIĆ:

This dilemma does not change the Government's jurisdiction.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

It can never be independent form the Government!

Zoran LILIĆ:

I propose that we conclude that the Federal Government implements this whole business as soon as possible, bearing in mind the procedure before the Commercial Court.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

So what is happening with the SDPR now?

Zoran LILIĆ:

They are now operating as a joint ownership holding company and are registered against the law. This ought to be annulled by the court within about ten days. After that we shall do all this business. The Government will appoint the chairman of the Executive Board, the director and the control of the whole business.

The only problem that can occur are companies registered abroad, which are probably registered as private individual ownership. There are bound to be problems with proving ownership, etc. But this is the job before of us.

Pavle BULATOVIĆ:

This property will "escape" from us!

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

It cannot escape, this would be theft!

Zoran LILIĆ:

We know where the companies are, we know who the directors are and that there are different ways to get money. Therefore, first we need to do this job and appoint people who can be trusted.

Can we approve that? (Agreement)

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

This is just an initial step to solving the issue of the SDPR?

Zoran LILIĆ:

Many other organs in this country will be involved in the issue of SDPR. This is the first step which has to enable us to get relevant information.

The next sub-item under current issues is

INFORMATION ON RECRUITMENT AND ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF
PERSONS PLACED AT DISPOSAL DONE BY THE GENERAL STAFF
OF THE YUGOSLAV ARMY

This has been done according to our last meeting's conclusion.

You have received the material.

I give the floor to General PERIŠIĆ

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

In line with our political principle that the Yugoslav Army should be transformed according to ethnic structure, we have done it. Here are the complete indicators that it has been done:

According to the 1992 census there are 62% Serbs in the FRY, and the number of /Serb/ officers in the Yugoslav Army is 68%. This includes 231 Serb officers placed at disposal. We have no legal grounds to dispose of them, but to terminate their service in the Yugoslav Army by the decision of the Supreme Commander, six months after they have been placed at disposal.

We have 5% Montenegrin officers. This includes 1,796 officers or 7.1%, which is higher than the number of population, but good in this situation. We have all /illegible/ at disposal who do not meet the criteria for professional soldiers.

There are 3.3% Yugoslavs, which is 9.75 of the total because many Montenegrins and Serbs have opted for Yugoslav affiliation. Of course, there are some “masked” ones hiding among this number, who are members of other peoples and ethnicities – there are 77 or 13% of these in total.

There are 1.1% Croats among the population, and we have 1,135 or 4.5% officers. We have 90 placed at disposal. You can see here that they are in disproportion with the population, but the majority of them married Serbs or Montenegrins. Unfortunately women have played the main role in this war, as is the case in life! (Laughter). The majority of these people showed that they are guided by the solemn obligation and oath they signed, and saving their country. They left their

closest relatives and joined us here. It would not be humane to remove these people, because over there he is a traitor, and here if we expel him from the Army, he can simply kill himself. But we have 90 such men placed at disposal who have not moved their families and keep in touch with them. We must get rid of these men because we are informed that part of these 1,133, which is 90 or 15.2%, do not meet the criteria to remain in the Army.

We have 0.5% Macedonians in the whole population, and 2.9% in the Army. This includes 37 of them at disposal, predominantly those who have not moved their families, got apartments there, and travel often. Many of these 37 are involved in the black market, and as such must leave the Army.

There are 3.1% Muslims, etc.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

Moma, there is no need to read this to us – we can all see it on the chart.

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

So, we have about 25 thousand men. This includes 591 at disposal. I think that this is not a significant number. We can see the ethnic structure here. We have not been biased anywhere. The only, and basic criterion was to remove these people if they do not deserve to be in the Army on the basis of their work, moral and overall qualities.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

It is important for us that a decent structure remains, except for the Albanians and Hungarians.

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

Mr President, about 2,000 men remain.

As for the 2nd Army, there are 55.8% Serbs, 23% Montenegrins, 6.7% Yugoslavs, 3.2% Macedonians, 2.5% Muslims, 4.6% Slovenians, 0.9% Albanians, 0.6% Hungarians, and 1.2% of the rest of them. This includes 27 not yet assigned officers in Montenegro. BABIĆ dealt with eight out of these 27, so only 19 remain unsolved and they will have to leave the Army. Therefore, it is obvious that there is no ethnic cleansing there at all.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

My question was based on information I have from the 2nd Army. I believe that the response is satisfactory.

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

This is the ethnic structure. Now I want to talk about recruitment in the Yugoslav Army.

Let's talk about the 2nd Army because it is characteristic. It was planned that a total of 19,050 soldiers would serve military service in 1994, but later the number was changed to 16,790 because we transformed the Army. The current situation is 11,342. Later it can be replenished with 9 thousand. For example in 1998, which is the most critical year, there will be 8,170. This means the difference is – 8,620 fewer. This difference between the planned and current situation ought to be filled with conscripts if we want to have the recruitment level at 80%. But 80% selectively, only for some units – military police, reconnaissance and border units, while the other units, depending on the level of danger, must be recruited at 100%.

If we want to reach the optimum of 80% then we would have to have 3,904 conscripts this year. In the coming years it would be 4,399. However, as we cannot keep the same people for a year, but we keep them for two months, it is six times this number. This means we should engage a yearly contingent of about 26,394 men from reserve forces.

However, as we got soldiers and farmers among these men, we only can recruit 4,216, which is much fewer than the real needs. We can replenish that with conscripts older than 35. It doesn't matter if we call them up in peacetime, so that we don't engage the population who has born the brunt of war all the time. We have these up to and over 35 who have not been assigned to war units, and we do not have always to have 80%. I talked with Boža this morning and there is no problem – in

this stage he would have to have about 500 - 600 conscripts and in the next stages from 1,000 – 1,200, which can be provided from this region. If some speciality is deficient there, we'll have a call up to military training on exterritorial principle, in a unit here, and then send them to fill in vacancies.

Generally there should not be major problems, except if the degree of war danger is higher, then we have to have 80%. Then we would aim to totally exempt farmers in the months which we have decided, and we could not engage the soldiers. I hope that the degree of war danger will decrease as days go by.

Here, you have a total of 134 thousand of farmer conscripts who are at disposal. There are 30,562 participants in the war and 120 thousand remain to be assigned, including 36 thousand up to 35 years of age and 84 over 35 years of age. You have everything there, I won't read it.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

Moma, you are planning to engage farmers for two months. You have two months in summer and three in winter. It is just redistribution.

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

I did not want to tire you with a comprehensive analysis. I am only telling you that the problem is with Montenegro and to an extent in the 3rd Army because we have

Muslims and Albanians, but we will replace them through exterritorial recruitment. If there is a danger of war you will probably decide to raise the level at my proposal.

Here, we have the wartime strength. We have so many farmers, etc.

In case of the escalation of the conflict I will indicate in good time that these categories should be recruited into units too.

Zoran LILIĆ:

All right, I think we can accept the first and the second information.

This practically brings us to the end of our planned schedule for today, except for the Decree on salaries and other income. This is more to inform you than to pass special decisions because this is the responsibility of the Government.

You have the approval of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Legislation /as written/ that this has been done correctly.

If there are any comments, please come forward.

Here are the average incomes in the Yugoslav Army for March. The highest salary is 381 dinars – Colonel General, and the lowest one is 103 dinars – contract soldier. These are net salaries. There is also the 10% Command – Staff supplement which all members receive on top of the base salary.

If you have any suggestions we can give them to the Federal Government.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

Civilians in the Yugoslav Army attended the Government session. That was the problem because they were not inclined to treat civilians as active servicemen, so it was decided that the Supreme Defence Council should consider that.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

Well civilians are one thing and active servicemen are another! A civilian does not have a troop supplement.

Zoran LILIĆ:

I suggest that this goes to Government. If there are any suggestions, please come forward.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

The suggestion is that the Government should be more careful with salaries – I mean not only military salaries, but all salaries. Because the tendency is developing to increase salaries every month. Salaries are going to drill a hole in our program if the trend of rising salaries continues. Everybody is ten times better off than they were

in January; they can't ask to be 50 times better off. It is better that a person is poor and healthy – he can become rich; if he seems rich but rotten, he will collapse. Therefore the situation is pretty stabilised, in economic terms - good. Salaries have been put in some order and there is no need to go to the newspapers with predictions like: they will rise that much, new cheques, etc. The dinar is stable, prices are falling. So, there is no reason for salaries to rise. We have to be very careful there. I told this to MARJANOVIĆ and the others who work on it.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

I said that as soon as I received the salary last month – it was almost 50% bigger than the month before, it was 350 dinars. I called Miki this morning because the Government and Trade Union want the guaranteed minimum salary to be 50 dinars. Then we in the Federal Government cannot pay this out of the money we have for the Army and us.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

Out of the question!

The Trade Union is something else – the program cannot collapse over the Trade Union.

Moma, how much were your salaries in DM in December?

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

Mine was 14 DM if I changed dinars immediately into DM! The lowest salary was 3 DM.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

This means that now your salary in real terms is 30 times bigger than in December!

Radoje KONTIĆ:

We will have a proposal for salary categories.

Zoran LILIĆ:

This solves the problem of distribution.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

It is really not logical that a federal deputy's salary is 350 dinars, which is the sum of my and Slobodan's salary!

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

Yes! How is it possible that they have that much?

Radoje KONTIĆ:

They in the Administrative Commission determine their salaries themselves.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

But they get the money from the Budget!

Radoje KONTIĆ:

But this is not under Government's jurisdiction – they determine their salaries themselves.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

The National Bank of Yugoslavia paid off these obligations according to the consolidated balance of accounts - for Montenegro 50% and for the Federal Budget 78%. People come to me and say: my salary is 168 dinars – we manage to get by, we accept it because there is no more. We have not received four million dinars for this month. This is almost 20% of our budget, but how can I explain that there is no more if my friend whom I send to the Federal Assembly gets four times bigger salary than mine?

Radoje KONTIĆ:

We are preparing a law which will cover everyone, but for the moment we do not have a possibility to solve this. We will introduce salary categories.

Zoran LILIĆ:

Will we solve the problem in the Army by adopting this?

Radoje KONTIĆ:

This is the current situation in the Army.

Pavle BULATOVIĆ:

In fact, this Decree does not change anything. It is just the implementation of the legal obligation on the management of salaries in the Army.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

I would appreciate it if we could consult about the Navy Day. I received this material. I consulted these people. The proposal for 10 August as Navy Day keeps coming back, if I remember well.

We agreed we would try to find a date from our recent history which is not so controversial. There was a proposal for 1 August when Montenegro for the first time in its history officially came out to the sea, which is now our common Yugoslav sea. But that was rejected because it was said that it was not Yugoslav, it was not common.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

This is irrelevant. Choose any date you want, only in summer.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

We determined that the Yugoslav Army Day will be the day of signing the military alliance between Serbia and Montenegro. The RVO /Air Force/ and PVO /Anti-aircraft Defence/ Day is 24 December – this is the decision of the Serbian Ministry of Defence and Radomir PUTNIK's General Staff of the known date around RVO and PVO /as written/.

I have read all justifications and explanations with regard to the Navy Day. This is not a very important date for me.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

What do you suggest?

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

I have two proposals: the first one is that it should be 1 August when we came out to the sea.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

We accept your proposal.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

The second proposal is that the Navy Day be the day when we formed the current fleet and rescued the ships which sailed into the bay of Boka Kotorska.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

What suits you more?

Zoran LILIĆ:

You decide yourselves.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

Now these thugs will jump up and say: see, they took, the sea from you and you are taking the date from 1918 which is historically controversial – Montenegro did not exist and Yugoslavia was not formed yet.

Zoran LILIĆ:

This is the 10 August proposal.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

Does 1 August suit you best? Which is the other date?

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

I don't know any other.

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

It is 19 May – the day when the FRY and Yugoslav Army were formed.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

This has nothing to do with the Navy. Let it be 1 August.

Zoran LILIĆ:

All right, let it be 1 August. A decent justification should be written for this.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

What will we do with FRY holidays? The law did not pass in the Assembly.

Zoran LILIĆ:

Do it again!

Radoje KONTIĆ:

Will it pass?

We proposed two days for the New Year; two days for 1 May; 27 April, the Statehood Day; 9 May, the Victory Day; and 4th July.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

These holidays are applicable now as well.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

Yes, except for 27th April. They persistently demand that religious holidays such as Easter be introduced.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

No chance – it does not happen anywhere in the world!

Radoje KONTIĆ:

All right, do you agree that we reintroduce the procedure for this Law?
(Agreement).

Zoran LILIĆ:

All right, this has been adopted.

The General is reminding me that we ought to adopt the minutes of the 19th session.

Are there any comments on the minutes of the 19th session? (There are not).

I hereby declare the minutes adopted.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

My apologies, I gave you wrong information – it is not 1 August, but 10 January.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

Moma 10 January is not good for the Navy – find a summer date. It is not important which date is chosen for land troops, but how can the day of the Navy be in winter?

Zoran LILIĆ:

When was this other date?

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

It's 19 May.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

It can be the day when the Decree was signed that the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ Navy becomes the Yugoslav Army Navy.

Momčilo PERIŠIĆ:

This had been done before and finalised on 19 May. All right, we can find a date.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

We understand the point. Only if they agreed on a summer date – it would be good.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

If we don't find a suitable date should it be 10 January then?

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

All right, if you don't find another date, let it be 10 January.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

This is the proposal which is regarded as one of the preferences in the Yugoslav Army Traditions material.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

Last time I said that we would take responsibility for 50 million dinars of bonds. We have done this. The decision was passed at a Federal Government

session. We are preparing an issue of bonds. We are doing it for the Army. But please, it must be understood that it is to solve the liquidity of the Budget – these are not their funds to use for new enterprises and orders. We have to pay this back within three months. We will be able to pay it back then. We are doing this mostly to enable the Army to pay back its debt to the Industry. Please do not understand that we have created an opening to bypass the budget when ordering things.

This is one thing.

The second thing is that our Federal Flight Control Administration has earned 70 million dollars in accounts abroad. Only 2-3 million have been paid in cash here. Now we cannot use these funds.

Some foreign agencies and firms are proposing to unblock these funds for a 15% commission.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

Don't accept that! We have to find a proposal where they are not going to fleece us. Why should we give them ten million dollars?

Radoje KONTIĆ:

I think it is small commission compared to what our companies are paying – it goes up to 30 %.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

These are scalpers who are getting rich!

Flight sanctions will be removed and then we will be able to get this.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

Is this Federal Government money?

Radoje KONTIĆ:

Yes, it's all my money.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

I would do it.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

Let's try to unblock it because if an agency can do it, so can we.

I suggest that we think about it for a while and ask around how to unblock it.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

As the sanctions increase the price of every imported item by 40%; 15% is tolerable. But I agree with Slobodan that we should investigate and see how we can do it.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

The next thing is revoking accreditation from foreign journalists. Sloba IGNJATOVIĆ revoked the France Press and CNN accreditations using his authorisation and the law, without previously consulting me. He has the right to do it. But I think that it would not be good if we went further. This caused considerable reaction in the country and abroad. I received a lot of protests and letters.

Pavle BULATOVIĆ:

But there is support as well.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

We have support in the country – the main support came from ŠEŠELJ. Do we have to extend this further or we have achieved our goal with these two agencies?

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

These who lie ought to be expelled.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

Then you have to expel our complete opposition press first.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

We have to suffer our opposition press, but not the other one.

IGNJATOVIĆ should inform us about what they write, what they are doing and whom he proposes. We ought to look into it. Because if they print in the papers everything these have published, this is pigswill. They use their stay in Yugoslavia as proof that they have witnessed anything – and all they are doing is lying shamelessly. The day before yesterday AKAŠI told me that the UN insisted and broadcast for three days that the French sergeant who was killed near Bihać, was killed by the Muslims. CNN did not want to broadcast that!

Radoje KONTIĆ:

CNN is paid!

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

New York Times also needs to be expelled. The Arabs bought half of its space.

I think that this is a very good warning to them.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

I think this warning is good. I don't know whether we should stop. Let us have a report drafted and then we'll see what we'll do.

Momir BULATOVIĆ:

The text about France Press in *Politika* newspaper yesterday was not convincing. They are quoting a member of our opposition who is lying – and /for them/ he is “objective”.

I believe we should have a report drafted for consideration.

Radoje KONTIĆ:

I don't know what's happening with this Soros company.

Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ:

They ought to be expelled! It is clear what Soros is!

(The session ended at 1430 hours)